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Abstract: Schumpeter’s unique type of evolutionary analysis can hardly be understood unless we
recognise that he developed it in relation to a study of the strength and weaknesses of the Wal-
rasian form of neoclassical economics. The paper demonstrates that Schumpeter’s major steps were
already performed in his first book Wesen und Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie. This
German-language book—which in English might have be called ‘Essence and Limits of Equilibrium
Economics’—was published a century ago (in 1908). It has never been translated into English and
no systematic evaluation is available.
The analysis of the 626 pages ofWesen provides many clues about the emergence and structure of
Schumpeter’s research programme. Although this programme included a modernisation of equilib-
rium economics, he concentrated on the difficult extension of economic analysis to cover economic
evolution. Schumpeter thought that his evolutionary economics required a break with basic neoclas-
sical assumptions, but he tried to avoid controversy by—confusingly—presenting it as only requir-
ing the introduction of innovative entrepreneurs into the set-up of the Walrasian system. Actually,
he could easily define the function of his type of entrepreneurs in this manner, but the analysis of
the overall process of evolution required a radical reinterpretation of the system of general economic
equilibrium. He thus made clear that he could not accept the standard interpretation of the quick
Walrasian process of adaptation (tâtonnement) and the standard uses of what became known as
comparative statics. Instead, he saw the innovative transformation of routine behaviour as a rela-
tively slow and conflict-ridden process. This reinterpretation helped him to sketch out his theory of
cycles of economic evolution as reflecting the pattern of change under capitalism. It also served to
define his life-long research programme and much of the Schumpeterian legacy.
Keywords: Joseph A. Schumpeter; Equilibrium economics; Evolutionary economics; Innovative en-
trepreneur; Evolutionary business cycles; Fields of evolutionary economics
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1. Introduction
It is often assumed that Schumpeter made the first formulation of his evolutionary re-
search programme in The Theory of Economic Development (Development). This assump-
tion is misleading for at least two reasons. First, the English edition of this book is the
somewhat modified translation of the second German edition of from 1926 (Entwick-
lung II). In turn, this is the radically revised version of the first German edition from 1912
(or 1911, if we emphasise the time at which it became available). Second, the first edition
of Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Entwicklung I) is clearly a sequel to Schumpe-
ter’s first book in which he—in 1908—announced the research programme that added
evolutionary economics to equilibrium economics. This book is called Das Wesen und
Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (Wesen)—and his has never been translated
into English.
Although Schumpeter’s programme for the development of economics can be recog-
nised in most of his writings, it is elaborated most carefully inWesen. Therefore it might
appear paradoxical that this book was only printed in 1000 copies and that it was not
reprinted until long after Schumpeter died in 1950. The reason is that he wanted to sup-
ply an improved edition. Schumpeter (1935, p. xx) thus in the preface to a new German
reprint of Entwicklung II referred to “a book on the ‘Theoretical Apparatus of Economics’
that shall serve in place of a second edition of my ‘Wesen undHauptinhalt’ ”. He not only
wanted to include the new developments in the toolbox of economics. He also recognised
that he had originally applied an old-fashioned and confusing terminology that became
increasingly incomprehensible during his lifetime. However, he did not succeed in pro-
ducing a replacement of Wesen. The incomprehensibleness of its terminology largely
explains why we are even today missing an English translation of the 626 pages of his
first book. However, if we are allowed the editorial freedom of updating the terminology
to that of his later works, the powerful argument might come alive at the centennial of
the publication ofWesen.
Schumpeter had no lack of confidence in his first book. WhenWesen had been printed,
he systematically distributed it to core economists. The most important was Léon Wal-
ras, the founder of general equilibrium theory. In a couple of letters to him, Schumpeter
pointed out that “this is a book of a disciple” and that he wanted to work under the Wal-
rasian “leadership” (Schumpeter, 2000, 43–4). Later, he found time to pay a visit—his first
and only—to Walras in Switzerland. However, the elderly Walras thought in terms of a
passively adapting economy and did not accept Schumpeter’s vision of economic evo-
lution (Schumpeter, 1989c, 166). Since he met similar reactions from nearly all the other
leading economists, he became aware of the hard work in front of him. Nevertheless,
Schumpeter always upheld his great respect for Walras and for equilibrium economics.
Furthermore, a careful study of the arguments of Wesen demonstrates that the presen-
tation of the complex Schumpeter–Walras relationship as one between a disciple and his
master is not totally wrong. Schumpeter was, however, the type of disciple who wants to
to confront new problems by innovating the teaching of his master very radically.
The importance ofWesen was recognised by several of Schumpeter’s contemporaries.
One of them was the Austrian-American Oscar Morgenstern, who is known for his con-
tribution to John von Neumann’s development of game theory. Morgenstern (1951, 198)
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got a copy of Wesen in the 1920s, and he remembered “what sort of revelation it was to
me when I first laid hands on it and, like many others of my generation, I resolved to read
everything Schumpeter had written and would ever write.” The reasons for the strong
effect ofWesen were given by Wassily Leontief, who was not only the inventor of input–
output economics but also one of Schumpeter’s friends. Leontief (1950, 105) started his
comment by pointing out that “this remarkable book remains practically unknown in the
English-speaking world”. Nevertheless,Wesen “contains the statement of his fundamen-
tal views which constitute the basis of Schumpeter’s whole scientific weltanschauung.”
Although the original presentation of this “scientific world view” is strongly focussed on
equilibrium economics, it nevertheless also serves to delineate his type of evolutionary
economics.
Schumpeter’s scientific world view is dominated by the dichotomy between equilib-
rium economics and evolutionary economics. Actually, he claimed that they constitute
the two fundamental branches of economics. The first branch of economics is the type of
equilibrium economics (initially called “Economic Statics”) that had been developed by
neoclassical economics in general and mathematical economics in particular. For a math-
ematical economist like Leontief (1950, 105), it seemed clear that the understanding of the
nature of this type of economics could be improved by “a clear and unequivocal state-
ment of its inherent limitations”, or of “the margins of its effective range”. It was exactly
what Schumpeter did inWesen. He did so for the sake of defining the realm of evolution-
ary economics (initially called “Economic Dynamics”)—the second fundamental branch
of economics. Thus Leontief emphasised that Schumpeter in his first book “specifically
designated what he called the process of development [evolution] as the particular aspect
which could not be encompassed by the conceptual schemes of static general equilibrium
theory.” Schumpeter emphasised the need of a strict division of labour of the two funda-
mental fields of economics:
“Statics [equilibrium economics] and Dynamics [evolutionary economics] are com-
pletely different fields, they concern not only different problems but also different
methods and different materials. They are not two chapters of one and the same the-
oretical building but two completely independent buildings. Only Statics has hitherto
been somewhat satisfactorily worked up and we essentially only deal with it in this
book. Dynamics [evolutionary economics] is still in its beginnings, is a ‘land of the
future’.” (Wesen, 182–3)
Although Schumpeter’s first book focussed on equilibrium economics, its purpose was
not only to propose a reform plan for this fundamental branch of economics. On the con-
trary, the problems, methods, and materials that he reserved for evolutionary economics
were those that, from the very beginning, engaged him as a researcher. He actually
pointed at this branch throughout Wesen. He did so by repeatedly emphasising what
problems equilibrium economics cannot solve. This negative definition of evolutionary
economics as covering parts of the residual problems left over by equilibrium economics
led to a positive definition. This definition was most clearly stated in Entwicklung I (464–
6):
• Equilibrium economics is “the theory of the circular flow”. It assumes a “certain
population with certain abilities and needs in a given geographical environment”.
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This population is “organised socially and economically in a given manner” and it
is “endowedwith certainmethods of production and stocks of goods”. Equilibrium
economics explains “the quantities and prices of all goods that are produced and
exchanged under these conditions”. The “motto” is: “Everyone adapts as good as
possible under given conditions”.
• Evolutionary economics is a “theory of the change of the data”, or rather some
of the parameters, that are assumed given by equilibrium economics. Schumpe-
ter’s evolutionary economics only treated changes of production functions and con-
sumption functions that are promoted by innovative entrepreneurs. The basic ques-
tion of this type of evolutionary economics is: “How does an economy carry out
the transition from one level—that has [previously] served as a point of arrival and
rest—to another level? This it the question of the essence of economic evolution.”
Although the present paper applies this distinction between equilibrium economics
and evolutionary economics, two caveats are needed. Schumpeter’s dichotomy seemed
inadequate to most economists even while he wrote his two programmatic books before
the First WorldWar. There are major problems. First, equilibrium economics was moving
toward the study of equilibrated dynamic change of the economic system. However,
Schumpeter rejected this dynamic equilibrium as an unrealistic substitute for the real
thing: evolutionary economics. Second, his definition of evolutionary economics seems
to be dependent on equilibrium economics. This is not a good starting point for the
establishment of a solid division of labour between the two fundamental branches of
economics.
2. Terminology matters: ‘evolution’ and ‘dynamics’
Readers of Wesen and Entwicklung I not only have to cope with 1,200 pages of Ger-
man text. They also have to overcome terminological problems that might hinder their
understanding of Schumpeter’s two programmatic books. Apart from many minor ter-
minological issues, there are two major ones that have already been hinted at above: the
meaning of the terms ‘evolution’ and ‘dynamics’. Let us start with ‘evolution’.
Schumpeter developed his evolutionary economics at a time when theorising about
evolutionary mechanisms was facing a general eclipse (after an upswing in the last half
of the nineteenth century). The reaction against the inflated application of this type of
theorising meant that during “the first few decades of the twentieth century evolution
was a dirty word” and that “[e]volutionism as a theoretical approach . . . was practiced or
endorsed only at risk to one’s intellectual career” (Sanderson, 1990, 45–6). This reaction
was especially strong while Schumpeter used German language as his primary means
of presenting his scientific contributions. It is in this context that we should interpret
Schumpeter’s remark in the second edition of his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
that
“we must be careful in dealing with the phenomenon of evolution [Entwick-
lungsphänomen] that we observe, still more with the concept in which we compre-
hend it, and most of all with the word by which we designate the concept . . . [A]ll
the over-hasty and insufficiently founded generalisations in which the word [soziale
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Entwicklung] plays a part have ledmany of us to lose patience equally with the word,
the concept, and the issue.” (Entwicklung II, 88–9; cf. Development, 57–8)
Schumpeter’s troubles with the word ‘Entwicklung’ and his wish to avoid attachment
to the wild speculations of Social Darwinism are probably among of the major reasons
why he decided to accept his translator’s replacement of it by ‘development’ in The Theory
of Economic Development. This unfortunate decision was possible because of two possible
translations of a single German word. The commonsensical and the technical meaning
of the German word ‘Entwicklung’ has evolved over time. Its original meaning was
‘unwinding’ or ‘unrolling’, and thereby it had the same core meaning as the Latin word
‘evolutio’. The book of antiquity was a rolled volume of writing, and ‘evolutio’ meant
unrolling, or reading, such a book. Therefore, the English ‘evolution’ started in parallel
with ‘Entwicklung’, and their basic meanings referred originally to goal-directed and
pre-programmed processes.
Then Darwin published his Origin of Species with its radically different account for
change. As a result, the word ‘evolution’ started to obtain a new meaning, and it ended
up denoting the unplanned process of irreversible change. Fortunately, English language
had another word—‘development’—that could take over the original meaning of ‘evolu-
tion’. This was not the case in German in which the same word for a long time was used
for both pre-programmed development and the newly discovered type of evolutionary
process. While this ambiguity could be overcome by using in German the foreign word
‘Evolution’, no general solution had been found when Schumpeter wrote his German
works. Even in English we still have problems of terminology. For instance, the study
of the change taking place in poor countries was called the theory of economic develop-
ment at a time when it appeared to concern the goal-directed transition to the economic
structures of the rich countries. The term ‘economic development’ is still used although
the concept seems increasingly to have changed toward an evolutionary one. The reason
may partly be that it is uncomfortable to speak in terms of ‘evolutionary development
studies’.
The story of terminological ambiguities and the gradual removal of these ambiguities
is to some extent reflected in Schumpeter’s major books. The strangest formulations are
found inWesen and Entwicklung I, where he used “Economic Dynamics” to denote what
we today call evolutionary economics. Schumpeter went through an intermediate level of
terminological confusion in the 1920s and early 1930s (Entwicklung II andDevelopment)
before he in his later books—Cycles, Capitalism, and History—reached a terminology
that is relatively satisfactory from a modern viewpoint. Especially, he in Cycles tended
to comply with the modern usage of ‘evolution’ as denoting the open-ended and largely
unpredictable process of transformation of, for instance, languages, biological species,
and economic routines.
Unfortunately, the earlier unsatisfactory terminology is abundant in the Schumpeter
literature because it tends to conserve his early terminology. The present paper applies
the alternative strategy of using his mature terminology for the translated extracts of
his two first books. In might even be advisable to retranslate their titles rather freely.
According to the present interpretation, Das Wesen und Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Na-
tionalökonomie should be called “The Essence and Limits of Equilibrium Economics”. To
emphasise that Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung is a sequel, it ought to be called
E.S. Andersen: A centennial appraisal of Schumpeter’s first book 5
“The Essence of Evolutionary Economics”. Since this suggestion seems to radical too be
generally accepted, a better alternative is “The Theory of Economic Evolution”.
There are other terminological ambiguities in Wesen and Entwicklung I than those
related to the term ‘evolution’. The most obvious ones relate to Schumpeter’s all-
encompassing dichotomy between “Economic Statics” and “Economic Dynamics”. Al-
though this dichotomy is crucial for the arguments inWesen, he largely applied the terms
in quotation marks and he pointed out that the terminology is “very unfortunate” (We-
sen, 182). One of the problems was that it was likely to create confusion, and this problem
was to an overwhelming extent confirmed by a large literature that in the next decades
tried to clarify the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy but instead createdmore andmore confu-
sion. The main problem was that the words ‘statics’ and ‘dynamics’ were used to denote
a large number of concepts, and that these concepts have often been very loosely de-
fined. Therefore, Fritz Machlup (1959, 109) characterised them as “kaleidoscopic words”.
Just like children have used the old-fashioned tube with mirrors and coloured glass to
produce a huge number of different patterns, economists have used the “kaleidoscope”
of the static–dynamic dichotomy to develop a surprisingly large number of meanings.
According to Machlup, the problem “is not that the division of economic analysis into
Statics and Dynamics makes no sense, but that it makes too many senses”.
Schumpeter’s life-long struggle with the terms ‘statics’ and ‘dynamics’ is reflected in
numerous and ever-changing remarks in Entwicklung I, Entwicklung II, Development,
and Cycles; and History. The 1920s was a time transition, and in 1934 he stated: “I
first used the terms ‘statics’ and ‘dynamics’ for these two [theoretical] structures, but
have now (in deference to Professor Frisch) definitively ceased to use them in this sense”
(Development, xi). By applying the tradition of mechanics to economics, Ragnar Frisch
(1992, 392) pointed out that the difference between static and dynamic propositions (laws)
is simply a question of whether the concepts “rate of growth” or “response rate” (with
respect to time) are used or not. This means that “the distinction between statics and dy-
namics refers to the analytical method, not to the nature of the phenomena. Wemay speak
of static or dynamic analysis, but not of a static or dynamic phenomenon” (p. 400). How-
ever, “phenomena as such may be stationary or evolutionary.” Furthermore, there is “the
distinction between what may be called analytical dynamics and historical dynamics in
economics.” Frisch capturedmany of Schumpeter’s ambitions by stating that “[h]istorical
dynamics can be said to be an attempt to analyse those phenomena which have not yet
been incorporated in, or which it is not possible to incorporate in, rigorously formulated
theoretical laws” (p. 400; emphasis removed).
While Frisch’s broad use of the term “evolutionary” to cover all non-stationary phe-
nomena gradually disappeared, his use of the terms “statics”, “analytical dynamics”, and
“historical dynamics” convinced both Schumpeter and the rest of the economics profes-
sion (partly through Samuelson, 1947, 311–17). This usage decouples method and phe-
nomenon so that, for instance, “evolutionary” phenomena can be studied by both static
and dynamic methods; and dynamic analysis can use both abstract time and historical
dating of events. However, neither Frisch nor Samuelson was interested in the type of
evolutionary processes that engaged Schumpeter throughout his academic life. Actually,
Schumpeter (1991, 424–5n) remarked that they and most other economists concentrated
on the study of the simple dynamics of the economic variables within an unchanging
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Method of Analysis Phenomenon/Process
Stationary Non-Stationary
Growing Evolutionary
Statics (1) (2) (3)
Dynamics
Analytical (4) (5) (6)
Historical (7) (8) (9)
Table 1: Schumpeter’s later use of the terms ‘statics’ and ‘dynamics’ (based onHistory, 963–7).
The matrix of possibilities demonstrates that he gave up his early strong coupling between
phenomena and methods. He also suggested that the analysis of evolutionary processes can
make good use of static methods.
economic framework. This might be called “evolution” in the “wider sense” and it in-
cludes “growth”, but he was obviously interested in the “narrower sense” of evolution
with abrupt changes of “institutions, tastes, or technological horizons” (History, 964).
It was not before the last couple of years of his life that Schumpeter made the necessary
clarification on this point and obtained nine cases (see Table 1)—ranging from the static
analysis of stationary phenomena (Case 1) to the historical dynamical analysis of muta-
tive evolutionary phenomena (Case 9). This result was obtained in the unfinished section
in History (963–7) on “Statics, Dynamics; the Stationary State, Evolution”. The termino-
logical discussion in this section indirectly served to emphasise that his work focussed
on mutative evolutionary phenomena and that it was performed by means of analyses
that applied the methods of statics, analytical dynamics, and historical dynamics. Fur-
thermore, these characteristics distanced him from practically all other practitioners of
dynamic analysis. Although he, in 1946, remarked “that during the last twenty years or
so an economic dynamics has emerged”, he had to emphasise that “this dynamics has
nothing to do with the factors that are incessantly at work to change the structure of eco-
nomic life” (1991, 424–5n). However, the static and dynamic analysis of stationary and
growing economies provided him ways of developing his own work.
3. Programmatics for the twentieth century
Wesen was the outcome of Schumpeter’s careful and independent study of the state of
the art of his chosen science. His science was dominated be the results of the neoclassical
revolution from the 1870s and onward. As he later emphasised, the maturation of this
revolution meant that economics had entered “a classical situation in our sense” (His-
tory, 754). The “leading works” of this classical situation “exhibited a large expanse of
common ground and suggest a feeling of repose, both of which created, in the super-
ficial observer, an impression of finality”. When Schumpeter spoke of “the finality of
a Greek temple that spreads its perfect lines against a cloudless sky” he was probably
not least referring to the beautiful architecture of Walras’s model of an economic system
in general equilibrium. However, he recognised that the “classical situation” was better
expressed by Alfred Marshall’s (1961) Principles of Economics. This book is “the classical
achievement of the period, that is, the work that embodies, more perfectly than any other,
the classical situation that emerged around 1900” (History, 834). It obtained this status
by de-emphasising general equilibrium analysis and by promoting a pragmatic form of
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economic analysis that could relate to the statistical and historical work of the historical
school and point towards the analysis of long-term economic evolution. Nevertheless,
Schumpeter added that “in the last decade or so before the outbreak of the First World
War, even the superficial observer should have been able to discern signs of decay, of new
breaks in the offing, of revolutions that had not yet issued into another classical situation”
(p. 754).
Schumpeter was no superficial observer and he immediately focussed on the chal-
lenges for economic research. The architecture of the theoretical constructs of the leading
neoclassical economists had been obtained at serious costs. Especially, the relationship
between crucial facts of economic life and the theories of academic economists had be-
come even more troublesome than before. One of the most fundamental reasons for the
discrepancy between neoclassical theory and facts of economic life is that the facts are
reflecting a rapid historical process. Marshall (1897, 121, 133) emphasised this problem
when he prepared for the turn of the century by addressing “the new generation”. He
pointed out that social science is “the reasoned history of man” and that “the true an-
alytical study of economics is the search for ideas latent in the facts” that are provided
by “the historian and the observer of contemporary life”. He especially focussed on the
challenge of analysing the long-term social and economic changes. Since he had not
made this task sufficiently clear in the first edition of his Principles of Economics, he now
pointed out that the crucial step forward was to analyse “evolution”, or “progress”. This
is the background for his famous statement that “[t]he Mecca of the economist is eco-
nomic biology rather than in [mechanical] economic dynamics” (Marshall, 1898, 42, 43).
In Schumpeter’s (1941, 106) semi-centennial appraisal of Principles, he pointed out that
“Marshall held a definite theory of economic evolution, though true to his habit he did
not press it upon the reader’s attention”. Actually, this theory “stood in the very center
of his thought.”
When the American Thorstein Veblen (1898; 1899–1900) in a series of papers confronted
the question “Why is economics not an evolutionary science?”, he chose to ignore the con-
tribution of Marshall and to confront the neoclassical analysis by John B. Clark, a leading
American economist. Veblen argued that although the evolutionary theories of Darwin-
ism and Social Darwinism were spreading rapidly in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, they had not influenced the core of economics. His explanation was that eco-
nomic theorists had been engaged in defending the status quo of the capitalist economy
by building static models that showed that a perfect market economy gave optimal re-
sults. To build such models, economists had applied unrealistic assumptions of pleasure-
seeking hedonism, anti-social atomism, and instantaneous calculations. Veblen’s solution
was that economic theory should instead apply the assumption of instinctive and habit-
based behaviour—since such behaviour explains the emergence and gradual evolution
of economic institutions.
For theoretically minded economists, it was Veblen who seemed to be out of touch with
the actual scientific development. He suggested to abandon solid non-evolutionary the-
ory in favour of an evolutionary economic sociology that he never specified in a precise
way. Furthermore, he ignored the difficulties of evolutionary analysis that several leading
neoclassical economists—including Marshall and Carl Menger—had tried to overcome.
Finally, he took no notice of the fact that Darwinism was facing a crisis even in biology.
E.S. Andersen: A centennial appraisal of Schumpeter’s first book 8
These and other characteristics of Veblen’s arguments meant that Schumpeter, although
he hardly took explicit notice of the arguments, was one of his critics. When Schumpeter
started to write in the first decade of the twentieth century, most biologists had accepted
the phenomenon of evolution; but they thought—wrongly—that the Darwinian mecha-
nism of natural selection had been outdated by explanations based on the inner character-
istics of organisms (learning, laws of organismic functioning, and genetic mutation). At
the same time, it had become clear that Social Darwinism had led the social sciences into a
quagmire of largely unfounded speculation. On these backgrounds, a strong reaction set
in against the very tendency that Veblen tried to promote. This reaction helps to explain
why Schumpeter saw hasty evolutionary theorising as part of the problem rather than
as part of the solution. Instead, he saw the theoretical core of economics as a structure
that should be developed and complemented instead of being thrown away—as Veblen
seemed to suggest.
Schumpeter’s special brand of evolutionary economics, as well as his approach to the
modernisation of neoclassical economics, can to some extent be seen as a response to the
Marshallian challenge. However, he did not try to develop what has later been called
“Marshall’s evolutionary economics” (Raffaelli, 2003). Instead, his response followed
anti-Marshallian lines. Schumpeter rejected not only a loosely defined “economic biol-
ogy” but also the feasibility of the gradual movement from static analysis to evolutionary
analysis. Instead, he thought that the novel field of evolutionary economics should be
created in relative isolation. His reasons were that those engaged in core neoclassical eco-
nomics were essentially dealing with the functioning of given economic systems; the mat-
uration of this type of analysis was hampered by the Marshallian strategy of the gradual
expansion towards evolutionary issues. Furthermore, Schumpeter seems to have agreed
with Veblen that the development of neoclassical economics to modern non-evolutionary
economics required behavioural assumptions that hindered the development of evolu-
tionary economics. However, Schumpeter’s conclusion in Wesen was that a division of
labour between two complementary types of economic analysis was necessary. Here he
applied the idea by Clark that economics consists of two fundamental branches. Schum-
peter initially followed Clark in calling these branches “Economic Statics” (equilibrium
economics) and “Economic Dynamics” (evolutionary economics). In the preface to We-
sen, he emphasised that his
“exposition depends on the fundamental separation between economic ‘Statics’ and
‘Dynamics’, a point whose importance cannot be overstated. For the time being, the
methods of pure economics are only sufficient for the former area, and our results
hold only for this area. ‘Dynamics’ is something that in any respect is completely
different from ‘Statics’, methodologically as well as regarding contents. . . . We shall
see . . . that it [the separation] holds the key to the solution of many controversies and
many apparent contradictions” (Wesen, xix).
Schumpeter thus not only considered the strict division of labour between equilibrium
economics and evolutionary economics from the viewpoint of producing scientific results
but also as a means of overcoming scientific conflicts. Since the core conflict that he was
facing was the battle of methods between the neoclassical economics of his native Austria
and the German historical school, Wesen had to add a third branch of economics to the
two we have already considered: historical and statistical economics. The importance of
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the three branches of economics is summarised in Schumpeter’s concluding statement
that “it shall always stay our principle to be silent—or . . . to delimit ourselves to sum-
maries of facts—about things on which we have nothing exact or sufficiently interesting to
say” (Wesen, 618–19; emphasis in original). His general imperative of being silent about
things “on which we have nothing exact . . . to say” points at equilibrium economics. The
exception that we should deal with things about which we can say something “suffi-
ciently interesting”—although we cannot initially make fully formalised propositions—
point at evolutionary economics. The exception of making propositions that serve as
limited “summaries of facts” points at the main activity of the historical school. Given
Schumpeter’s main principle of exactness and his two exceptions,Wesen can be read as a
reform programme for economics that acknowledges the relative independence of three
branches of economic analysis:
1. Equilibrium economics. This branch should be promoted by recognising the cru-
cial alliance between mathematics and neoclassical economics and by cleansing it
everything that does not concern the interdependent system of economic elements.
2. Evolutionary economics. This novel branch should be given a chance to develop
separately instead of being hidden and constrained by its superficial inclusion in
neoclassical treatises. Furthermore, equilibrium economics should recognise that
some of the topics it would like to cover can only be treated in a fundamental man-
ner within evolutionary economics.
3. Historical and statistical economics. This branch of economics should be allowed
at least the same degree of independence as the experimental branches of the nat-
ural sciences. It is especially crucial for evolutionary economics since it tends to
cover the institutional setting of the evolutionary mechanism as well as the histori-
cal change of that mechanism.
4. Equilibrium economics and the historical school
Although neither equilibrium economics nor historical and statistical economics is the
main topic of the present paper, they cannot be ignored in an appreciation of Schumpe-
ter’s first book. Let us start with equilibrium economics since it is treated extensively
through the foreground argument of Wesen. This argument ignores the differences be-
tween the major contributors to neoclassical economics—from Jevons, Menger and Wal-
ras to Pareto and Marshall—by defining the “essence” of equilibrium economics in rela-
tion to Walras’s model of the economic system. Schumpeter’s presents this mathemati-
cal model in verbal terms. Therefore, German-speaking students who found themselves
handicapped when confronted with the mathematical form, and the level of abstraction,
of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics could use Wesen instead. The book served the
same function in the US. Here Wesley Mitchell, an important statistician and institution-
alist economist, used it in his lectures at Columbia University in the 1920s. Mitchell (1969,
376) summarised the hard-core contribution ofWesen by emphasising that “Schumpeter
develops substantially just one important thesis which is the most important result of
Walras’s speculations.” The large size of the book is caused by its “elaborate method-
ological discussion of what he is going to do, the way in which he is going to do it, the
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limitations of what he had done, and finally the importance of the results which he set
forth.” Although this elaborate discussion serves to point at evolutionary economics, its
apparently major function is to demonstrate that “pure economics” concerns the “find-
ing how the essential results can be demonstrated with utmost economy of intellectual
means” (p. 377).
Part I ofWesen is called “Foundation” and it provides a “criticism . . . that is necessary
when asking about the foundations of theoretical economics” (Wesen, 26, emphasis re-
moved). This criticism suggests a cleansing of the expositions of economic theory from
anything that are not essential. This cleansing is needed because nearly all writers of
economic textbooks ignored that they were presenting a formal system that that is based
on axiomatic assumptions. For instance, we may think of of Marshall’s Principles of Eco-
nomics that spends the first 270 pages motivating the basic assumptions underlying the
theoretical apparatus and continues to include motivating digressions. Such amotivation
requires intrusion into the realms of other sciences, like psychology, in which economists
are “only dilettantes”. Furthermore, this intrusion provides “points of attack for the ad-
versaries” (Wesen, 24). Just like the science of mechanics would never have been created
if it had continued to be engaged in explaining what “power” and “mass” really is, the
science of equilibrium economics cannot be grounded in this way. Instead, economists
have to acknowledge that they presuppose a system of interdependent elements. The
solution to the problem of economic interdependence is served by focussing on marginal
evaluations performed by each economic agent (pp. 71, 105–7). Since these evaluations
are reflected in observable behaviour, the “value principle” does not need the psycholog-
ical reflections of many neoclassical economists.
Part II deals extensively with “The Problem of Static Equilibrium”. Since any difference
in the evaluations of the marginal contributions to an agent’s utility would contradict
equilibrium, they have to be equalised according to the “law of the level of marginal util-
ity” (Wesen, 129–31). We may also say that the relationship between the marginal utilities
of any two goods have to be equal to the reverse relationship between their prices (p. 213).
This rule, the “alpha and omega” of pure economics, can also be used for the analysis of
the problems of production. He thus explains the Walrasian theory of price: the defini-
tion of a system of equations that simultaneously determines all quantities and all prices
(pp. 260–2). He also presents the limitations of the solution by rehearsing the poor state of
price theory with respect to “limited competition” and by remarking that perfect compe-
tition is at best an approximation to reality (pp. 269–72). This approximation, however, is
good enough for many purposes. It not least clarifies the theory of money to a surprising
degree (pp. 276–7)—while the theory of saving seems to be in a poor state (pp. 304–5).
Part III handles the “Theory of Distribution”. This is not only “the most important
application of price theory” but also a tool for unwarranted answers to highly controver-
sial socio-economic problems (Wesen, 315–16). Economists had normally tried to explain
(and justify) the incomes derived from labour, land, and physical capital. In addition to
wage, rent, and interest on capital, some economists had added entrepreneurial profit
as a fourth basic category of income. Wesen points out that much of the confusion on
these matters is due to the study of the factors of production instead of their productive
services. Given the latter “artifice” (p. 372), the size of wages and rents can easily be
determined by including the services of labour and land as elements of the system of eco-
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nomic equations (pp. 330–1, 368). In contrast, entrepreneurial profits cannot be treated in
this system because they are expressions of disequilibrium. The concrete explanation of
interest on capital was a more controversial matter but practically everyone agreed that
it should be included as a source of income in an equilibrated economic system (p. 392).
Schumpeter disagrees because of the close connection between profit and interest on cap-
ital. In any case, he argues that when compared with classical economics, his truncated
theory of distribution is a major advance because it explains wage and rent in exactly the
same way and because it is a more powerful analytical tool (p. 379).
Part IV moves from what John Stuart Mill had called “the laws of coordination” to
what Schumpeter, together with Mill, call “the laws of motion” (Wesen, 443). This part
of the book has the heading “The Method of Variation”. Schumpeter seems to be the
first to describe this method—which today is called comparative statics—systematically.
If we take a “snapshot” (Wesen, 142) of an equilibrium state and change one element of
the system, then we would like to know in advance what the snapshot in the resultant
equilibrium looks like. To make this prediction, we need to take something as given: the
consumption functions and the production functions of the economic agents. However,
these functions cannot be used for the analysis of the response of the economic system
to major or discrete changes. Comparisons between equilibria that are separated by long
time periods are also problematic since they draw attention away from the major changes
of the functional relationships that are likely to occur during such periods. Therefore, the
method of variation is, in general, only applicable in the immediate neighbourhood of
an equilibrium of the given economic system, measured in time and in the state space
of the system. This limitation and the possibilities of overcoming it are illustrated by 40
pages of examples on taxes, import duties, changes of income, and the introduction of
machinery (pp. 478–519).
Part V has the long title “Summary of Conclusions on the Essence, Cognitive Value,
and Development Possibilities of Theoretical Economics”. This long heading precedes
one hundred pages of conclusions! Nevertheless, the conclusions are simple with respect
to the above argument. First, the demarcation of the domain of equilibrium economics
should be defined by the set of problems for which its basic model and the underlying
“schema of exchange” can be applied (Wesen, 582). Second, the “methodological and
epistemological essence” of pure equilibrium economics demonstrates that it is “a ‘natu-
ral science’ and its theorems are ‘natural laws’ ” (p. 536). Third, this science is best served
by sticking to its place in the scientific division of labour. Although economic research
and the writing of economic textbooks might reflect inspiration from the tools of the nat-
ural sciences and the contents of other social sciences, they should be cleansed from the
frequent intrusions into the domains of other sciences (pp. 536–53).
Schumpeter’s three conclusions provide a surprisingly accurate description of much of
the later development of modern economics. They suggest that equilibrium economics,
especially through its Walrasian formulation, forms a “closed and autonomous province
within the realm of knowledge” (p. 523). As Schumpeter later said (History, 242, 827),
Walras had created the “Magna Carta” of this province—both as the first complete map
and as the original constitutional document—and this made him “the greatest of all
economists”. Even for those unfamiliar with the development of the English constitu-
tional law based on the Magna Carta of the year 1215, the meaning of the underlying
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caveat should be clear: Walras, of course, was not perfect. Nevertheless, he had demon-
strated that the “subject matter” of economic theory “is a cosmos and not a chaos” (Cy-
cles, 41) and he had implicitly determined the borderlines of equilibrium economics.
Schumpeter’s emphasis on the narrow limits of equilibrium economics can be inter-
preted as his contribution to the resolution of the battle of methods the Austrian school of
neoclassical economics and the German historical school (seeDoctrine, 167–74). The fore-
ground argument about the narrow domain reserved for equilibrium economics leaves
plenty of room for alternative modes of study—and this point is explicitly made. The
first signal is found on the first pages of the preface. Schumpeter stated that “nearly ev-
ery ‘school’ [‘Richtung’] and every individual author are right in their propositions . . .
from the standpoint of the purposes for which they are intended”. Therefore, the task is
to “learn, not criticise; analyse and work out the correct in each proposition, not merely
accept of reject” (Wesen, v–vi; emphasis removed). Although these statements are gen-
eral, they are especially intended to cover controversies within theoretical economics as
well as the battle of methods. However, Schumpeter immediately adds that he consid-
ers the controversy “between pure theory and history to be largely overcome” and that
he for each scientific problem will “investigate whether the one or the other treatment is
most recommendable” (p. vii). In contrast, the “whole history of the battle of methods”
can be described by the sentence: “Everyone is convinced of his exclusive rights while he
only partially can demonstrate this, and the beginner does not know which to adhere to”
(p. xvi).
Part I continues this story. The battle of methods is hardly surprising since even natural
sciences like chemistry and mechanics are characterised by controversies between exper-
imentalists and theorists as well as in the camp of pure theory (Wesen, 4–6). This problem
was overlooked because the historical school started by attacking classical economics at
a time when it had entered a period of deep stagnation that even crippled the creativity
of the great Stuart Mill (pp. 9–10). Hence it is understandable that the historical school
chose to throw abstract theory overboard and concentrate on facts and practical prob-
lems. However, the members of this school never understood the nature of the theorising
of the emerging neoclassical economics. Instead, they started “the development of new
theories on the basis of historical materials” of which the “most well known example of
this is probably the ‘Theory of Modern Capitalism’ by W. Sombart” (p. 18). Schumpeter
emphasised that this group seemed to be “in a quick upswing and soon will dispose of
a significant literature.” This literature “does not build an abstract system, but makes
individual hypotheses on concrete questions . . . [that] relate always to definite histori-
cal facts.” Such hypotheses have “similarity with the hypotheses of biology”; and this
similarity “is strengthened by their dealing mostly with the problems of evolution [Ent-
wicklung]. They are everything else than ‘static’, . . . [b]ut perhaps the area of ‘Dynamics’
belongs to them! That will have to be seen” (p. 18).
These formulations demonstrate that Schumpeter did not dismiss history-friendly the-
orising. Actually, he simply considered the “descriptive” method and the theoretical
method as two ways of handling facts. Since both methods have inductive and deduc-
tive elements, there is no basic difference. The only difference is that the theorist tries
to cover whole classes of fact by developing a formal model that is characterised by the
utmost economy of thought (Wesen, 41–4). This level of formality and simplicity is only
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applicable to few areas of social life. Furthermore, the overselling of the descriptive ac-
curacy of abstract theory was quickly recognised by empirically oriented researchers and
contributed to the battle of methods (p. 48).
The apparent founding of equilibrium economics in a broadly conceived atomism and
individualism was also highly provoking for researchers who emphasised altruism and
collectivism (Wesen, 82). The problem is that many economic treaties start with a speci-
fication of Homo Economicus or other theoretical versions of Homo sapiens. This is, how-
ever, not the strategy of Schumpeter (pp. 85–7). As equilibrium economists, we should
not consider economic agents—households and firms—from their inside through psy-
chology or from the viewpoint of organisation theory. Instead, agents should be studied
from outside, from what we as researchers can observe about their behaviour. This is all
we need if we take serious that we are dealing with the properties of a system of quan-
tities of goods and exchange relations between them (prices). The theoretical agents are
designed to fit the model of this system. To emphasise this point, Schumpeter coined the
phrase “methodological individualism” and dedicated a whole chapter for clarifying the
issue (pp. 87–98).
Parts II–IV can be browsed quickly since we know their main contents from the above
account. With respect to the battle of methods, we simply need to note that Schumpe-
ter, at each major step of his argument, emphasises the limited scope of theoretical eco-
nomics and thus the room for alternative treatments. For instance, theorists make “formal
assumptions” while others might make “theories on the causes of economic action” (We-
sen, 129). These theories might concern the interdependent influences of “[r]ace, cultural
level, social position, education, personality” well as those of “the natural environment
and social organisation” (p. 142). In contrast, the theorist only needs assumptions on
the preferences that determine short-term choice in the economic system. Furthermore,
production technology and industrial organisation are also represented by parameters by
the theorist while they are problems for the studies of the historical school (p. 148). The
fact that Marshall treated these topics extensively only serves to create confusion about
the real structure of the standard model of the economic system (p. 150). Similarly, the
basic model fails to support an extension of economic theorising into the long run and
thus to the great phenomena of economic evolution (pp. 177, 186). The impression of a
limited contribution of theoretical economics and the need for a complementary effort
by the historical school becomes stronger and stronger. It also covers money and finance
(p. 297), saving behaviour (p. 308), and long-term issues of rent on land (pp. 375–6).
Part V’s narrow programme for theoretical economics obviously leaves a very large
domain for the historical school. Actually, the members of this school had already occu-
pied much of this domain while they considered the domain of theoretical economics of
very little interest. Therefore, they could hardly oppose Schumpeter’s conclusion. This
conclusion was that theWalrasianMagna Carta allowed him to “preach a kind of Monroe
Doctrine of economics” (Wesen, 536), that is, a dual principle of foreign policy: no accep-
tance of intervention from foreigners, no attempt to intervene against outsiders. If this
doctrine was accepted, the transgressions of the battle of methods were overcome. The-
oretical economists could concentrate on developing and applying their analytical tools
within safe borderlines. At the same time, these borders defined the domains in which
the historical school should not fear any attack from the theorists. It was also outside the
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borders of equilibrium economics that evolutionary economics could be established.
5. From Walras’s entrepreneur to Schumpeter’s entrepreneur
Although Schumpeter only hinted at his concept of the innovative entrepreneur inWesen,
this book might nevertheless be considered the birthplace of this concept. His attempts to
develop his evolutionary economics probably started from the Walrasian system. Many
years after he wrote his Wesen, he emphasised his immediate recognition of the limita-
tions of this system. In the preface to the Japanese edition of Development he stated that
he discovered that Walras’s focus was not made for purely methodological reasons. On
the contrary, “Walras would have . . . said (and, as a matter of fact, he did say it to me
the only time that I had the opportunity to converse with him) that of course economic
life is essentially passive” (Schumpeter, 1989c, 166). According to Walras, economic life
“merely adapts itself to the natural and social influences which may be acting on it”. This
implies “that the theory of a stationary process constitutes really the whole of theoreti-
cal economics and that as economic theorists we cannot say much about the factors that
account for historical change, but must simply register them.”
Walras’s conception of a passively adapting economy provoked Schumpeter’s criti-
cal response that was based on his elitist vision of economic change: “I [Schumpeter]
felt very strongly that this was wrong, and that there was a source of energy within the
economic system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium that might be attained”
(Schumpeter, 1989c, 166). His vision of this disruptive force determined his analytical ef-
forts. He felt confident that “there must be a purely economic theory of economic change
which does not merely rely on external factors propelling the economic system from one
equilibrium to another.” Schumpeter emphasised that “[i]t is such a theory that I have
tried to build and I believe now, as I believed then, that it contributes something to the
understanding of the struggles and vicissitudes of the capitalist world”. The scientific
contribution of his theory is that it “explains a number of phenomena, in particular the
business cycle, more satisfactory than it is possible to explain them by means of either the
Walrasian or the Marshallian apparatus” (p. 166).
Schumpeter thus developed his evolutionary economics in opposition to Walras (and
Marshall). However, there is little doubt that his reading of Walras’s (1954) Elements of
Pure Economics directly influenced his evolutionary theory. Since this influence is difficult
to detect in Wesen, we shall start the study of this issue by the account for the emerg-
ing evolutionary economics that we find in Schumpeter’s “Dynamic Theory of Interest”.
The starting point is the theory of interest on capital developed by his teacher Böhm-
Bawerk. Schumpeter tried to rescue parts of the Böhm-Bawerkian theory of interest as
a permanent source of income by emphasising that is was a contribution to “dynamics”
rather than to “statics” (Wesen, 428, 408–13). However, his own theory of interest started
from the viewpoint of the entrepreneur who created radically new lines of production in
a given economic system. Although the presentation of his alternative theory logically
should have been postponed to Entwicklung I, he considered it so important that he in-
serted a sketch in Wesen (414–30). Here he suggested that his theory might partly be
expressed in terms of Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of advantageous roundabout methods of
production. Themain point is that the use of roundabout methods does not generally and
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permanently create an ability to pay a premium to the capitalist savers. Instead, it is the
investment of entrepreneurs in innovations with higher productivities that provides the
profit that can be used to pay interest. They do so by solving an inter-temporal problem.
The presently available “world of goods” is governed by a system of prices that has no
room for the innovative project. However, if some of these goods are brought into a “new
combination”, then they can be used to produce a future output that can pay a premium
when measured in terms of the present price system. The condition is that—although the
present state has no room for it—credit money is created for the innovative project. With
these money the entrepreneur detracts some of the present goods for his innovative pur-
pose. His demand for “purchasing power” (p. 427) essentially explains the phenomenon
of interest.
Given his emerging evolutionary economics, it is not difficult to detect how Schum-
peter developed his criticism of the sketches of a dynamical process that are found in
Walras’s Elements. The driver of this sketchy dynamics of the economic system is an
agent that is presently best denoted the Walrasian entrepreneur, or the W-entrepreneur.
This W-entrepreneur has a paradoxical role in Walras’s essentially static system. On the
one hand, the W-entrepreneurs bring the elements of the system together into a coher-
ent whole through an equilibrating process that is motivated by profit opportunities. On
the other hand, the holders of the role of W-entrepreneurship have no income when the
system has moved to equilibrium. These two characteristics of the Walrasian system be-
come clear as soon as we consider its basic structure. Walras (1954, 222) defined a role list
that contains four essential types of agent. The list starts by calling “the holder of land
. . . a land-owner, the holder of personal faculties a worker and the holder of capital proper
a capitalist”. Then the list designates “by the term entrepreneur a fourth person, entirely
distinct from those just mentioned”. The role of this fourth type of agent “is to lease land
from the land-owner, hire personal faculties from the labourer, and borrow capital from
the capitalist, in order to combine the three productive services in agriculture, industry
or trade” (p. 222).
From these role descriptions of the “dramatis personae” (History, 554), it is obvious
that W-entrepreneurs are at the centre of Walras’s model world: Their function is to com-
bine the elements and thereby create an integrated economic system. The individual W-
entrepreneur hires the necessary factors of production at given conditions of payment,
and he initiates a process of production in which one of the employed workers function
as a manager. When the goods have been produced, he sells them at the market price that
is prevailing at that time. Then the W-entrepreneur makes up his balance sheet. Depend-
ing on the costs of the factors of production and the price of the goods, his bottom line
shows either gain or loss. Such positive or negative profits, however, only exist as long
as the economic system is in disequilibrium. According to Walras, this disequilibrium
is removed by perfect competition among W-entrepreneurs. When this competition has
brought the system into equilibrium through a process of trial and error (tâtonnement),
the W-entrepreneurs “make neither gain nor loss” (Wesen, 438).
Walras’s equilibrium thus has an apparently paradoxical characteristic: his W-
entrepreneurs that are driven by the profit motive obtain no profit whatsoever. Hence
he must conclude that in equilibrium the W-entrepreneurs model have to obtain their in-
comes by functioning as landowners, workers, or capitalists. Schumpeter thought “that
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this entrepreneur is only a fiction” that is created because of the limitations of Economic
Statics (Wesen, 438). However, he also recognised the possibilities of inserting an alterna-
tive entrepreneur, the S-entrepreneur, into a reinterpreted version of the Walrasian sys-
tem. The background was that he thought that Walras’s account for the tâtonnement pro-
cess gives a false picture of the speed of themarket process. WhileWalras saw the groping
toward equilibrium as a speedy process without disequilibrium trading, Schumpeter fol-
lowed the Austrian school by considering it very slow and erratic. It has thus, somewhat
provocatively, been remarked that “Walras’s tâtonnement takes a minute; Menger’s tâton-
nement takes a century!” (Streissler, 1973, 174; emphasis removed). Carl Menger’s Aus-
trian successors, especially Friedrich vonWieser, developed this view on the slow process
of “imputing” values to intermediate goods and primary production factors, based on the
valuations of consumer’s goods. It probably is not least the sluggishness of Wieser’s tâ-
tonnement process that Schumpeter refers to when he states “that L. Walras and v. Wieser
are those authors whom the author [Schumpeter] believes he is closest to” (Wesen, ix). It
also seems clear that the his reinterpreted W-entrepreneur is almost identical to Kirzner’s
(1973) neo-Austrian version of the entrepreneur.
Schumpeter’s interpretation of the Austrian tâtonnement gave room for the adding of
a Schumpeterian entrepreneur to the W-entrepreneur. What Schumpeter missed in the
Walrasian model, he most clearly suggested in his second book: “The men who brought
forth modern industry were ‘all-of-a-piece people’ and not pathetic figures who steadily
asked whether each effort that they had to perform really gave a sufficient surplus of util-
ity” (Entwicklung I, 137). Instead, “[s]uch men create because they cannot do otherwise”
(p. 138). Although Schumpeter wanted to develop a model that places such creative en-
trepreneurs at the centre of the mechanism of economic evolution, that mechanism also
needed non-innovative agents. The solution was ready at hand. The adaptive response
to the deeds of the creative entrepreneurs could be modelled by means of a revised ver-
sion of the Walrasian system with routine-based behaviour of ordinary agents. The most
important of these agents was a reinterpreted version of the W-entrepreneur interpreted
as a routine-based manager.
Schumpeter’s distinction between innovative and non-innovative agents provided him
with the elements of his “theory of the change of data” (Entwicklung I, 464). The data are
the parameters that determine the behaviour of non-innovative agents. In contrast, the
innovators take these ‘parameters’ as the starting point for their innovative projects. They
can base the evaluation of the profitability of their projects on the Schumpeterian conjec-
ture that the other agents of the economic system do not adapt quickly. This conjecture,
which has some similarity with the conjecture that Cournot ascribes to his oligopolists,
cannot be based on the flexible behaviour ofWalrasian entrepreneurs. It is, instead, based
on a revised version of Walras’s concept. We are thus facing three different concepts of
entrepreneurs:
• TheWalrasian entrepreneur adapts to the changed parameters of the economic sys-
tem and thereby contributes to the establishment of equilibration of that system.
The formal role of this agent in the general equilibrium systemmeans that although
time is not included in the concept, we are actually facing instantaneous reaction.
• The Schumpeterian manager is the Schumpeterian version of the Walrasian en-
trepreneur. The behaviour of the Schumpeterian manager is based on routines.
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This means that adaptation takes time and that adaptation to major change is im-
possible or difficult for this type of agent.
• The Schumpeterian entrepreneur disturbs the equilibrium by buying and using re-
sources to change one of the ‘parameters’ of the economic system. The financing of
the project of making such a change is motivated by an expectation of profit. This
expectation is based on the characteristics of the project as well as on the Schum-
peterian conjecture of sluggish response from the rest of the economic system.
6. From equilibrium economics to evolutionary economics
Schumpeter’s interpretation of the Austrian tâtonnement seems to have been that the slow
emergence of a consistent price system reflects the adaptation of agents with bounded
rationality to the living conditions of a nation. Based on the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy,
he saw this as a specification to the “first problem of economics”, that is, to find the
equilibrium state of the economic system from given parameters (Entwicklung I, 464–
5). The second great problem of economics, however, was not treated. It concerns the
development of a “theory of the change of data [parameters]” (Entwicklung I, 464–5).
The problem of this evolutionary theory is how “an economy accomplish the transition
from one level . . . to another level” (p. 466). As already mentioned, Schumpeter (1989c,
165) recognised this problem “when in my beginnings I studied theWalrasian conception
and the Walrasian technique”. Although he “as an economist owed more to Walras than
to any other influence”, he wanted “to construct a theoretical model” that answered “the
question how the economic system generates the force which incessantly transforms it”
(p. 165). The birthplace of Schumpeter’s comprehensive evolutionary analysis, probably,
can be found in his account for Walrasian comparative statics (Wesen, 441–519).
Schumpeter’s name for comparative statics is “the method of variation”, that is, the
study of the response of the endogenous variables to an exogenous change. He empha-
sised that this study of the variation of the endogenous variables presupposes that the
production functions and consumption functions of the economic system do not change.
This means that the response to the exogenous change has to be small and take place
quickly. An example of the problems created by a major change is described in terms of
the marginal value of money (Wesen, 471–4). Since the evaluation of money is the out-
come of long experience, a major change means that the economic agents have to restart
their “ ‘learning to count’ ” (p. 473). This learning is hindered by the fact that the value
of money is closely related to the “standard of life” required to be member of a certain
economic class. For instance, the consumption functions of the land-owning nobility
will only respond gropingly and unwillingly to a downward or upward change in the
marginal utility of money (p. 474). This and similar processes are excluded from compar-
ative statics. What is missing is a “theory of the change of data”. While “the first problem
of economics” concerns a given state of the economy, its second problem is: “How does
an economy accomplish the transition from one level . . . to another level? This is the
question about the essence of economic evolution” (Entwicklung I, 465–6).
Although comparative statics is limited to the “first problem of economics”, Schum-
peter nevertheless considered it a major contribution to the toolbox of economic anal-
ysis. The serious application of this tool requires “higher mathematics”, that is, ad-
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vanced forms of integral and differential calculus. Since the design of Wesen excluded
the demonstration of the use of these methods, he stated that “I hope soon to have the oc-
casion to add what is missing in this respect” (Wesen, 445). This came close to a promise
of delivering the book that he later called “The Theoretical Apparatus of Economics, in
which I want to improve the quantitative methods of modern economics” (Schumpeter,
2000, 283). Wesen, however, concentrates on persuading the reader with only rudimen-
tary mathematical skills that “higher mathematics” is needed. The major example used
for this persuasion is the rather equation-dense analysis of the effects of the introduction
of a quantity tax on a particular good (Wesen, 484–97). Schumpeter applies properties of
the functions defined implicitly by theWalrasian system of simultaneous equations to an-
swer the question what happens to the optimal solution because of the imposed tax. The
change of the price of the good creates a chain reaction that is decomposed by means of
Taylor’s formula. The different elements of this decomposition are then studied by inte-
gration and differentiation. The conclusion is that the controversy on tax issues emerges
because different assumptions are made concerning the form of the functions and be-
cause some elements of the decomposition are ignored. A shorter analysis of protective
tariffs on imports also reveals that protectionist arguments normally include economic
evolution (pp. 503–9).
Since Schumpeter never developed these sketchy arguments into a systematic use of
“higher mathematics”, one might suspect that this neglect is based on lacking mathe-
matical skills. This is hardly true. The real reason for abandoning the Walrasian form of
comparative statics and the related types of mathematics is to be found in the seriously
limited range of problems that they cover. Of course, it we are willing to renounce on a
high level of precision, we may by means of comparative statics “force our way towards
the problems of Dynamics” (Wesen, 518). How far we can come in this way towards
evolutionary economics, however, is an empirical question. Schumpeter clearly thought
that the results of comparative statics with respect to the “problems of Dynamics” would
not be satisfactory for him: “We can never surge into their core; the great tendencies of
evolution [Entwicklungstendenzen] surely go past our systems, plays on other scenes.
We perceive their voices only as the rumbling of a distant thunder” (p. 518). His reason
was that these “tendencies of evolution” could not be derived from the type of economic
agent on which comparative statics is, more or less explicitly, founded: “What a piti-
ful miserable figure he is, our economic subject who is always looking so anxiously for
equilibrium. He has no ambitions and no entrepreneurial spirit; in brief, he is without
force and life” (p. 567). It seemed obvious to him that “[e]ven the ordinary process of the
economy is full of life and movement and has to be conceptualised in steady evolution
[Entwicklung]. However, we stand puzzled towards the phenomenon of evolution and
the ‘high problems’ of economic progress” (Wesen, 567).
Schumpeter had begun his analysis of the the “phenomenon of evolution” and the
“high problems” of “economic progress” before he started to design his first book. When
he wrote Wesen, he already knew how to point at the major problems that he would
confront in his evolutionary economics, and he even knew some of the theories that he
would apply. Unfortunately, this fact has not been recognised in most of the Schumpeter
literature. To promote the study of the close relationship between the two programmatic
books of his youth, it seems warranted to emphasise an event that probably influenced
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both of them. This event is pointed at in Schumpeter’s preface to Entwicklung I:
“I took my point of departure in concrete theoretical problems, first, and that was
in the year 1905, in the problem of crises. Step by step, I felt driven further into an
independent new treatment of still further theoretical problems until it finally became
clear forme that I was always engaged in one and the same fundamental idea and that
this idea relate to thewhole domain of theory and allowsmoving the boundary stones
of theoretical knowledge in the direction of the phenomenon of economic evolution.”
(Entwicklung I, vii)
Schumpeter’s dating of the start of his evolutionary research programme to 1905—
three years before he finalisedWesen—hints at a very concrete background for his speci-
fication of the problems of economic evolution: the Böhm-Bawerk Seminar in the summer
term of 1905. Böhm-Bawerk was both locally and internationally considered as the rep-
resentative of the Austrian school—and his international fame as an economist was only
surpassed by AlfredMarshall. He had obtained this status through his large book on Cap-
ital and Interest as well as through a very long series of controversies on the topics of this
book. He wanted to review of the criticism against his book andwrote a new version of it.
Thesewishes seem to have set the agenda for his research-oriented seminar that under the
general theme of value theory discussedMarx’s work and his own theory. His reputation
attracted very capable students from both wings of Austrian political life (Haberler, 1950,
337–8). While Schumpeter tried to transcend the controversy, the neo-Marxist wing in-
cluded Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding and Emil Lederer while the conservative-liberalist
wing included Ludwig von Mises as well as Böhm-Bawerk himself.
Since Schumpeter was not a Marxist in any ordinary sense, one might have expected
that hewould sidewith Böhm-Bawerk andMises. This was not the case, however. Haber-
ler (1950, 338) found out that “in the heated debates . . . Schumpeter attracted general
attention through his cool, scientific detachment”. Schumpeter’s approach to scientific
controversies, which we have already considered, explains his detachment with respect
to both neoclassical economics and Marxism. He had no ambition of simply defending
neoclassical economics in the form that it had taken in the hands of the Austrian school.
Instead, his task was to work out the correct kernel of both theoretical structures of eco-
nomics. The fact that he inWesen concluded that equilibrium economics is unable to treat
“the great tendencies of evolution” was obvious. Thus the neo-Marxist Nikolai Bukharin
(1972, 57) grasped this part of Schumpeter’s account in his otherwise rather superficial
attack on the Austrian school. He emphasised that, according to “Schumpeter’s admis-
sion” in Wesen, this school is unable to treat the “speedy accumulation of capital, its
concentration and centralisation, the uncommonly rapid progress of technology, and fi-
nally, the regular occurrence of industrial crises”. However, Schumpeter did not think
that the Marxian analyses of these phenomena were satisfactory.
Schumpeter’s participation in the Böhm-Bawerk Seminar had directed him strongly
towards the study of capitalism as an evolving system driven by the prospects of profit
and interest on capital. This was, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the research
field of the neo-Marxist school and the younger members of the historical school. At that
time, new life was brought to the historical school by theMarx-inspired work of Sombart,
Spiethoff, and Max Weber. Furthermore, the neo-Marxist school that wanted to move
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from Marx’s Capital to the theoretical problems raised by modern capitalism. They anal-
ysed the emergence of large-scale enterprises, relations between industrial and financial
capital, business cycles, imperialist tendencies, nations and multi-culturalism, the strati-
fication of the working class, the sociology of law and public finance, andmethodological
issues. However, Schumpeter thought that the burst of neo-Marxist creativity was seri-
ously flawed by adherence to the Marxian type of grand synthesis between economics,
sociology, history, and policy analysis. In contrast, Schumpeter wanted to cut the Gordic
knot of synthesis and try to establish more limited and sober forms of coordination of
knowledge (Capitalism, Ch. 4). The purpose of this alternative strategy was to promote
the scientific understanding of the strange process of economic evolution that he later
denoted by the term “the capitalist process” (Cycles).
Schumpeter’s participation in the Böhm-Bawerk seminar of 1905 provides a new per-
spective to the argument of Wesen. In this perspective, equilibrium economics concerns
the short-term functioning—and administration—of a given economic system. However,
the concept of capitalism does not refer to this set of scientific problems and it seems
appropriate leave out the related concepts of capital (Wesen, 164–7). Actually, there is a
large number of phenomena that “can only be understood from the standpoint of evolu-
tion. Here belongs the problems of the formation of capital and others, especially those
of economic progress and the crises” (p. 587). Wesen contains multiple hints about these
and related problems. Even with respect to the price of the services of labour and land
he to some extent suggested the application of evolutionary economics. With respect to
the value of land, he thought that “all that is really interesting in it gravitates toward the
great problems of evolution” (p. 374) and that he had found “a seed for a new theory”
(p. 588n). Finally, he presented an entrepreneur-based theory of interest on capital in a
section called “Prolegomena to a Dynamic Theory of Interest” (pp. 414–30). Obviously,
such ‘introductory remarks’ have to be followed by amore extensive treatment. Although
this treatment is found in Entwicklung I, the development of core aspects of evolutionary
economics are present inWesen.
The degree to which Schumpeter was able to do develop his evolutionary economics
in a precise manner can be studied in his second book. Thirty year after its publication
he stated that “I tried to show that distribution in capitalist society is dominated by the
fact that capitalism is an evolutionary process and therefore displays phenomena which
we cannot hope to discover in a study of a stationary economy” (Schumpeter, 2000, 333).
The explicit problems treated in Entwicklung I (p. 463) are “[t]he essence of the capitalist
economy, the entrepreneurial profit, the interest, the crises”. InWesen, we find only find
a single hint about Schumpeter’s initial problem of crises and business cycles. He simply
stated that equilibrium economics is unable to handle this problem: “The static system
and its methods provides us with no means of explaining this phenomenon. Under the
assumptions of statics . . . there would be no crises, although some of their effects can be
demonstrated fairly well” (Wesen, 588).
7. The evolutionary scheme and cycles of economic evolution
The present paper could stop here. However, we are still missing an understanding of
how Schumpeter proceededwith the analysis of his problem of crises and business cycles.
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Since his efforts in this respect completes the bridge between Wesen and Entwicklung I,
it is fortunate that he was so happy with his results that he published them separately in
1910. Let us consider how he reached these results.
Assuming that Schumpeter had the problem of crises in mind from 1905 and onward,
he must have been provoked by reading Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics—especially
by its Part VII. At that point of his book, Walras had alreadymoved through a series of ap-
proximations to economic reality. Thereby, “the system of the economic universe reveals
itself, at last, in all its grandeur and complexity: a complexity at once vast and simple,
which, for sheer beauty, resembles the astronomic universe” (Walras, 1954, 374). How-
ever, he continued by sketching a couple of further approximations to reality under the
heading “Conditions and Consequences of Economic Progress”. He first dealt with the
reproduction of equilibrium as a stationary process—like the closed input-output system
that reproduced year after year in Quesnay’s Tableau Économique (p. 378). Here Walras
has moved from his an abstract study of equilibrium to a stationary equilibrium. This
is a routine-based equilibrium into which the Schumpeterian entrepreneur can be intro-
duced. However, Walras does not consider this possibility. Instead, he simply assumed
the exogenous change of the “basic data”, i.e. the parameters, of his model of the eco-
nomic system.
When Walras (1954, 380) turned “from the static to the dynamic state”, he assumed
that “the annual production and consumption, which we had hitherto represented as
a constant magnitude, change from instant to instant along with the basic data of the
problem”. As examples of these data he mentioned “the initial quantities possessed, the
utilities of goods and services, the technical coefficients, the excess of income over con-
sumption, the working capital requirements, etc.” The change of these data means that
the economic system is “perpetually tending towards equilibrium without ever actually
attaining it, because the market has no other way of approaching equilibrium except by
groping, and, before the goal is reached, it has to renew its efforts and start over again”.
Therefore, “the market is like a lake agitated by the wind, where the water is incessantly
seeking its level without ever reaching it” (p. 380).
Schumpeter obviously did not subscribe to this analysis of the emergence of disequi-
librium due to exogenous parameter change and the re-establishment of equilibrium by
endogenous forces. He hardly found better the improved Walrasian image of an agitated
lake that strived towards a gradually increasing level because of exogenous scientific
progress and endogenous savings. While this image is implicitly suggested by the ex-
tended analysis of the last edition of Elements, we shall stick to the earlier version of the
analogy of the disequilibrated lake. This analogy was developed whenWalras (1954, 381)
turned from “wind” to “storm”. He did so in relation to the problem of crises: “just as
a lake is, at times, stirred to its very depths by a storm, so also the market is sometimes
thrown into violent confusion by crises, which are sudden and general disturbances of
equilibrium.” Here it is the exogenous “storm” that as an exogenous force created major
oscillations around the equilibrium level of the “lake”. Walras specified the economic
waves in terms of the movement of a single price. The upswing of the wave implies
that “a selling price will remain for long periods of time above cost of production and
continue to rise in spite of increases in output”. The crisis implies that “a fall in price,
following upon this rise, will suddenly bring the selling price below cost of production
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and force entrepreneurs to reverse their production policies.”
Schumpeter clearly was challenged by the Walrasian analogy and wanted to replace it
by “the perennial gale of creative destruction” (Capitalism, 84). While he largely accepted
the Walras’s story of the movement from disequilibrium back to equilibrium, he rejected
the story of the creation of disequilibrium because of the influence of exogenous forces.
This rejection did not imply that he excluded the creation of waves of economic activ-
ity by exogenous factors. It instead implied that he found exogenous factors radically
insufficient for his explanation of long-term evolution. Instead, Schumpeter’s probably
used his emerging theory to reinterpretWalras’s statements as reflecting the, more or less,
endogenous activity of his innovative entrepreneurs. If the reactions to entrepreneurial
projects are slow, then their selling prices remain above costs for a relatively long period;
and the average prices can increase because of the additional demand for resources cre-
ated by a group of such projects. However, when this type of demand disappears, the
average prices will fall below the costs of at least those following old routines, and their
economic responses are either adaptation or bankruptcy. This seems to be “the essence of
economic evolution” (Entwicklung I, 466).
Schumpeter tried to account for the essence of economic evolution as simply as pos-
sible. He did so by means of a dichotomy that has some similarity with his Statics–
Dynamics dichotomy. He later summarised the modified dichotomy by stating that the
“process of industrial mutation” takes the form of “revolutions” that “occur in discrete
rushes which are separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet”; this means
that there “always is either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution” (Cap-
italism, 83n). Although this was obviously the Schumpeterian vision of the process of
economic evolution, it is probable that his choice of analytical scheme was strongly influ-
enced by analytical convenience. Actually, he had to weaken the generality of his type
of evolutionary economics to reach an analytical scheme that he, to some extent, was
able to handle. More specifically, the purpose of Schumpeter’s assumptions is to allow
an untraditional form of equilibrium analysis. His concept of equilibrium implies that
the evolutionary process has come to a temporary halt, and this concept allowed him
to study evolution in well-defined steps. In the simplest case, the innovative activities
emerge from a routine system characterised by this type equilibrium, and after the im-
plementation of the innovations, a new equilibrated routine system emerges:
• Initial equilibrium: We start from an economic system in which evolution has come
to a halt so that it is based on solid routine behaviour. This system is assumed
to have found an equilibrium that allows the economic agents year after year to
operate in their accustomed ways.
• Economic innovation: The initial equilibrium breaks down when a minority of in-
novators renews some of the routines. Under capitalist conditions, a strong credit
system helps these innovators—the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who establish
new firms.
• Creative destruction and renewed equilibrium: After a competitive struggle be-
tween agents related to old and new routines, a renewed and well-established rou-
tine system emerges.
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• Long-tern economic evolution: The renewed equilibrium forms the basis for an-
other phase of disturbing innovative activity. The long-term economic evolution
of the routine system consists in a series of routinised equilibria and innovative
rebellions against these equilibria.
Schumpeter first developed this scheme of evolutionary analysis in relation to his core
problem of crises and business cycles. The scheme was not included in Wesen but pub-
lished two years later in his large paper “On the Essence of Economic Crises”, of which
much was included in Chapter 6 of Entwicklung I. Here we recognise that Schumpe-
ter, like Marx and in contrast to most other economists, chose “to look to business cy-
cles for material with which to build a fundamental theory of capitalist reality” (History,
1135). What Schumpeter’s paper added to the literature on crises and business cycles is
largely the demonstration that an evolutionary theory of crises can easily be constructed
by means of his general model of economic evolution. Since a treatment of this demon-
stration is beyond the scope of the present paper, we shall simply jump to his conclusions
(see Table 2 on the next page). Schumpeter (2005, 50) concluded by listing nine theses that
summarise “the fundamental ideas of our argument”, and these theses were not included
in Entwicklung I. Theses 6–9 concern the application of Schumpeter’s basic evolutionary
scheme for the study of economic crises while theses 1–5 presents this scheme in a highly
abstract way.
The interpretation of Schumpeter’s theses is not easy. Thesis 1 seems to provide a
summary ofWesen by proposing that is possible to use the Statics–Dynamics dichotomy
to decompose economic processes into two classes. However, we should note that both
classes are defined for the purposes of evolutionary economics. Thus the movement to-
ward a stationary state is understood in terms of Schumpeter’s modification of Walras’s
equilibrium-seeking dynamics. Thesis 2 emphasises that it is not the exogenous change
of the economic structure but only what Schumpeter considered endogenous change that
is included in the dynamic part of his evolutionary economics. Thesis 3 adds that the
phase of evolution basically has to be considered as the disturbance of a general “static”
equilibrium in which evolution has come to a halt. As we have seen, the disturbance may
be specified as a challenge to the apparently given parameters of the economic system.
Thesis 4 tells that the innovative disturbance provokes the response of “the static masses”
in the direction of a new equilibrium. In the original formulation, Schumpeter used the
German word “Statisierung” to denote his version of the tâtonnement process. Thesis 5
describes the equilibrating process as the adaptation to the new system of marginal value
and price. It emphasises that the adaptive response by the “static masses” is not an easy
one. Instead, the Schumpeterian tâtonnement implies that at least some of the old eco-
nomic positions lead to bankruptcy rather than becoming adapted to the new parameters
of behaviour. Elsewhere in the paper, Schumpeter stated that it is not only the evolution
itself but also the “spasms of the collapse” after a crises that create “untenable situations”
that can “be transferred only step by step—par tâtonnement—into an equilibrium state”
(Entwicklung I, 454).
Although Schumpeter’s first five theses were general, they seems primarily to have
been designed for the study of economic crises. The rest of the theses serve to claim
a place for Schumpeter’s general theory of economic evolution in the literature on the
problem of crises and business cycles. Let us start with theses 8–9. They point out that
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Label Thesis
1. Process types “The economic processes fall into two separate and, in practice,
clearly distinguishable categories: static and dynamic.”
2. Evolution “The dynamic category constitutes the pure economic evolution
[Entwicklung], that is, those changes in the appearance of the
economy that develop out of the economy itself.”
3. Disturbance “Economic evolution [Entwicklung] is essentially a disturbance of
the static equilibrium of the economy.”
4. Equilibration “This disturbance causes a reaction in the static masses of the
economy; namely, a movement towards a new equilibrium state.”
5. Reorganisation “The process of convergence to the static state [Statisierung]
necessarily creates an end to each specific phase of evolution and
causes a reorganisation of the value and price system of the
economy and a general ‘liquidation’.”
6. Cycles “These statements [Theses 1–5] explain the phenomenon, which is
popularly characterised as the change between prosperity and
depression.”
7. Crises “During the process of convergence to a static state and, especially,
during the time of its inception, collapses can easily develop, which
we term economic crises kat> âxoqn [par excellence] and which
render the process ‘abnormal’.”
8. Coincidences “The economy—and, indeed, this includes the static economy—is
also exposed to coincidental disturbances, which, if they are
sufficiently significant, can cause such crises.”
9. Unimportance “But these [exogenously determined] crises present no problem,
they can indeed be effortlessly understood.”
Table 2: Schumpeter’s early theses on economic evolution and crises (Schumpeter, 2005, 50;
translation is modified). Theses 1–5 present Schumpeter’s general scheme for analysing eco-
nomic evolution in terms of the routines of the circular flow and their change. Theses 6–9
propose that this general scheme can be used to explain why endogenous economic evolution
takes a cyclical form.
economic crises may have exogenous causes (like bad harvests or the ending of war activ-
ities). According to Schumpeter, the economic consequences of such phenomena can eas-
ily be handled by means of equilibrium economics. However, the basic issue is whether
or not the economic system has an intrinsic tendency to produce recurrent crises. With
respect to the capitalist economy, the answer is yes; but the argument is not easy to find in
theses 6–7. Instead, these theses simply postulate that Schumpeter’s scheme can be used
for the explanation of business cycles and crises to the extent they are generated from
within the economic system by the disturbance of innovative entrepreneurs. The imme-
diate reason for the difficulty of understanding these theses is that the whole paper had
dealt with the question, so Schumpeter could summarise his results briefly. Elsewhere
he stated that the first entrepreneur paves the way for the next, and so on. Thereby their
innovative activity may obtain macroeconomic importance. Furthermore, the step in the
overall process of economic evolution is necessarily brought to an end by the forces that
promote equilibrium:
“The counter-movements do not merely obstruct evolution [Entwicklung], they put
an end to this evolution. A great many values are annihilated; the fundamental con-
ditions and presuppositions of the plans of the leading men in the economy are
changed. The economic system needs rallying before it can go forward again; its
value system needs reorganising. And the evolution that starts again is a new one,
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not simply the continuation of the old.” (Entwicklung I, 415; cf. Schumpeter, 2005,
17)
Thus, Schumpeter seems to emphasise that the complicated process of returning to
equilibrium from a highly disequilibrated state puts a brake on further innovation. As
a result, the innovative demand that had created the prosperity disappears; and, at that
point, the economic system can easily move into a full-fledged depression. However, the
economic system will ultimately reach a new equilibrium from which a new round of
innovation and adaptation can begin.
It is clear from even a very quick inspection the paper (and Chapter 6 of Entwicklung I)
that these claims on cycles and crises are only based on theoretical deductions from the
general evolutionary theory. However, the literature in which this theory wanted a place
was heavily empirically oriented. Therefore, Theses 6–7 cannot be considered real conclu-
sions but rather a research programme. The core tasks of this programme are to demon-
strate that there is a real tendency toward a stationary economy and that this tendency
punctuates any phase of economic development. Schumpeter often ignored these tasks.
Even inDevelopment (83n), he stated that the “stationary economy is . . . an incontrovert-
ible fact, apart from the fact . . . that there is a tendency towards a stationary state in every
period of depression.” Although these statements are hardly incorrect, they do not sub-
stantiate the claim of a simple coupling between his theoretical waves of evolution and
the facts of business cycles. However, Schumpeter probably thought that the available
empirical data supported his claim. He furthermore, in 1914, tried to place conception
of capitalist cycles in an empirical context. This was done in a paper called “The Wave
Movement of Economic Life” (Schumpeter, 1914). This paper pointed in the direction of
Schumpeter’s enormously ambitious but largely unsuccessful research report from 1939
on Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process.
Since he used “the capitalist process” as interchangeable with “the process of economic
evolution” (Cycles, 106), this was a serious setback for the further development of his
evolutionary economics. However, if we are willing to cut the Gordic knot of Business
Cycles, its elements provides a rich legacy.
8. The fundamental fields of evolutionary economics
We are now ready to conclude the present paper, but a part of the conclusion deserves
a separate section and the inclusion of additional information. The combined reading
of Wesen and some of Schumpeter’s most related works has provided us with a rough
impression of how he worked out evolutionary economics in a way that allowed him to
define its “essence”. By using this term he was not abandoning what Shionoya (1996,
Ch. 5) has described as his methodological instrumentalism. He was simply trying to
specify the concepts of his evolutionary economics that cannot be removed even in its
most abstract form. Compared with equilibrium economics, the crucial concepts seem to
be the innovative entrepreneur and the kind of change of the routines of the economic
system that is promoted by this entrepreneur. However, Schumpeter’s evolutionary con-
ception of science (which is specified in Part I of History), did not allow him to think in
terms of fixed definitions of any branch of science. Therefore, the specifications found in
Wesen and Entwicklung I should not be used to exclude an evolutionary economics that
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it built of a radically different concept of innovation. Especially, it should not be used to
exclude from his evolutionary economics the depiction of innovation as the routine-like
activity of large firms in their monopolistic competition. Furthermore, it should not be
used to exclude from evolutionary economics statistical and historical studies in the style
of the historical school. Such an exclusion would not only hit large parts of Schumpeter’s
Cycles. It would also deprive evolutionary economics from the essential driving force
that comes from novel empirical data that do not fit existing theoretical structures.
We arrive at this broader conception of evolutionary economics by combining two
aspects of the preceding analysis. First, we have in Sections 3 and 6 how Schumpe-
ter considered equilibrium economics and evolutionary economics as two fundamental
branches of economics with their own problems, methods, and materials. He empha-
sised that this separation “holds the key to the solution of many controversies and many
apparent contradictions”. Second, we have in Sections 4 and 7 seen how the empirical
data are crucial elements of each of the fundamental branches. This aspect ofWesen was
to clear when Schumpeter used it to obtained his “large doctorate”, he had to make a lec-
ture on “The Verification of Abstract Theorems by Means of Statistics”—and this lecture
might be seem as a forerunner to his later promotion of the Econometric Society (Schum-
peter, 1989a). Whenwe combine these two results, we recognise that Schumpeter thought
that it is not only equilibrium economics but also evolutionary economics that need the
services of econometricians and historians.
Although Schumpeter confronted the problem of relating to empirical data in Cycles,
he general formulations on the fields of economic analysis are especially dense in Part I of
History (and in Schumpeter, 1987). Here he defined the four “fundamental fields” of eco-
nomic analysis as economic theory, statistics, history, and economic sociology. He used
the term ‘fundamental’ to point out that these fields are relatively independent compo-
nents of economics as a science. The specification of the four fields can be seen as Schum-
peter’s final attempt to resolve the battle of methods between Menger and Schmoller. It
should be noted that while Menger’s work related to a single field, Schmoller’s historical
school had contributed to the development of three fundamental fields. However, con-
sidered as a description of equilibrium economics, Schumpeter’s list of the four fields of
economic analysis seem arbitrary. In contrast, when we are considering the evolution-
ary research programme suggested fromWesen and onwards, his list makes much better
sense. Even his one-man project of creating an evolutionary economics needed evolu-
tionary versions of all the fundamental fields—and he made some contributions to all of
them.
While the fields of theory, history and economic sociology seems easy to handle, the
field of statistics might need a comment. According to Schumpeter’s definition, this field
covers both the statistical methods and the results produced by means of these methods.
However, it seems relevant to emphasise that evolutionary statistics has been a core con-
tributor to the field of evolutionary theory ever since the great statistician and evolution-
ary theorist R. A. Fisher (1999). Another issue is that it seems relevant to add a fifth field,
although it is not fundamental in Schumpeter’s sense. However, he was repeatedly deal-
ingwith evolutionary economicmethodology. Since this methodology primarily emerges
from evolutionary research, the field cannot be called fundamental. It shall nevertheless
be singled out because evolutionary analysis has to overcome a large number of hard and
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unusual methodological difficulties. This leads us to the following list of the core fields
of evolutionary economics.
• Evolutionary economic theory. The Schumpeterian version of this field has general
characteristics, some of which have been discussed in the present paper. However,
it is important to recognise that subfields emerge from a serious study of Cycles
as well as from post-Schumpeterian contributions. The three major subfields are:
(1) microevolution in individual markets, (2) mesoevolution in clusters of markets,
and (3) macroevolution in all the interdependent markets of the economy (Dopfer
and Potts, 2008). Although Schumpeter emphasised macroevolution, his work has
hitherto primarily supported the study of microevolution and mesoevolution.
• Evolutionary economic history. Although evolutionary economic theory focusses
on mechanisms, it provides a theory of history. Therefore, it is obvious that its de-
velopment has to interact closely with the field of evolutionary economic history.
There are additional motivations for this field. First, the quantification performed in
relation to statistical work leaves an enormous residual of evolutionary processes
that still can hardly be analysed without the help of professional historians. Sec-
ond, it is still largely historians who provide the stylised facts for the institutional
analysis of evolutionary economic sociology.
• Evolutionary economic statistics. The tasks of this field are to produce, describe,
and derive results from quantitative data on economic evolution. Although Schum-
peter tried to promote the field with the help of friends like Ragnar Frisch andNico-
las Georgescu-Roegen, it is only today that we glimpse the emergence of what can
be called evolutionary econometrics or “evolumetrics” (Cantner and Krüger, 2004).
The latter term helps to emphasise that area has presently less similarity with mod-
ern non-evolutionary econometrics than with the econometrics of the 1930s—with
its “High Theory” and its relationships with the evolutionarily motivated biomet-
rics (Louçã, 2007). Such an evolumetrics seems to have a crucial role even in help-
ing to define what evolutionary economic theory is about: it provides a statistical
approach without which core concepts like ‘evolution’, ‘selection’, and ‘innovation’
can hardly be specified satisfactorily.
• Evolutionary economic sociology. Evolutionary economic theory often works un-
der the assumption that economic evolution takes place within given institutions,
and this analysis can be extended to a comparison of evolutionary processes in
different institutional settings. However, a kind of sociology is needed within evo-
lutionary economics since institutions (firms, markets, macroinstitutions, . . . ) are
themselves undergoing processes of evolutionary change. If evolutionary eco-
nomics analyses the coevolution between institutions and economic life in the nar-
row sense, evolutionary economic sociology tends to become part of evolutionary
economic theory (or vice versa).
• Evolutionary economic methodology. General evolutionary analysis raises difficult
methodological problems that have been explored by biologists and philosophers.
Evolutionary economic analysis might be enhanced by a ‘translation’ of these con-
tributions as well as by an exploration of the many additional problems that emerge
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when we analyse the interaction of economic agents with myopic experiences and
expectations. One way of securing that evolutionary economic methodology does
not produce sterile ‘battles of methods’ is to relate it closely to the study of the
troublesome history of evolutionary economics (Hodgson, 1993).
It should be noted that this list of the core fields of evolutionary economics is neither
a description of the organisation of Schumpeter’s work nor of present-day research. The
list is instead describing the core fields of a sustainable evolutionary economics, which
has not yet emerged. Schumpeter was, nevertheless, aware of the need for research efforts
in the mentioned fields. Actually, since he developed his evolutionary economic analysis
as a one-man project, he to a smaller or larger extent had to cover all of them. He did
so in a rather disorganised manner. For instance, Business Cycles covers all the fields
but it is only evolutionary economic theory and, to some extent, evolutionary economic
history that are treated systematically. The other fields are covered by scattered comments
whose places in the architecture of the book often seem unpredictable. However, the
mentioned fields should already have been predictable from a careful reading of Wesen
and Entwicklung I.
9. Further conclusions
The present paper can be considered an application of what Shionoya (2005) has
called “the currently dominant interpretation of Schumpeter”. Although this evolu-
tionary interpretation might be predominant among practically oriented researchers, the
alternative—or rather complementary—“institutionalist interpretation” that Shionoya
represents has been more active in studying Schumpeter’s life and work. However, nei-
ther of these approaches have been applied for the systematic appraisal of all Schum-
peter’s books. Two of these books seem especially neglected—Cycles and Wesen. Even
the full title of the former book—Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical
Analysis of the Capitalist Process—suggests that it is crucial to cope with this huge research
report on Schumpeter’s evolutionary economics and its unhappy marriage with business
cycle theory. However, an appreciation of Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen
Nationalökonomie is also important for promoting within modern evolutionary economics
what the present author has called “a ‘dialogue’ with older, verbal studies of economic
evolution” (Andersen, 1994, 1). Actually, this “dialogue” can hardly be sustainable unless
we come to grips with the book that Schumpeter published one hundred years ago.
It was Wassily Leontief’s description of Wesen that in the introduction motivated the
present paper. A major conclusion is that Leontief succeeded in presenting the essence of
an important book that might have been called “The Essence and Limits of Equilibrium
Economics”. This freely invented title can be read in two ways. On the one hand, it intro-
duces equilibrium economics to the beginner in a fascinating way. However, Schumpeter
realised that this introduction was getting outdated, and it is even more so today. If we
put the emphasis on “Limits”, the suggested title for a non-existing translation of Schum-
peter’s first book is much more interesting for present-day readers. The reason is that by
defining the limits of equilibrium economics, he clearly pointed at the realms of both the
historical school and his type of evolutionary economics. If we focus on the latter branch
of economics, its task is to analyse the mechanisms of the long-term evolution of the
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routines underlying the economic system. This evolution can be determined by environ-
mental change, and thereby we recognise an important area for evolutionary economics.
However, it was not this area that Schumpeter wanted to explore by means of his type of
evolutionary economics. His instead focussed on the type of evolution that is influenced
by and influences the distribution of economic income. This type of economic evolution
seems a core characteristic of capitalism, and it was the great problems of capitalist eco-
nomic evolution that motivated his pioneering research. Since this research programme
is still underdeveloped, the reading of Wesen and the subsequent re-reading of the rest
of Schumpeter’s work is still an element of present-day research whose value should not
be underestimated.
The reconstruction of the arguments of Wesen in the present paper has thrown some
light on the complex Schumpeter–Walras relationship as one between a radically innova-
tive disciple and a rather conservative master. The interpretation helps to resolve what,
probably, is the most difficult of the many paradoxes that emerges from Schumpeter’s
work. For instance, Morishima and Catephores (1988, 42) represent the idea of the Wal-
rasian Schumpeter: while it is “generally believed that Schumpeter’s hallmarks were the
terms ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘innovation’, and ‘new productive combination’ ”, these concepts
and the underlying ideas are actually “a direct extension of Walrasian concerns.” Schum-
peter has also been presented as a “Walrasian Austrian” (Schefold, 1986), while Freeman
(1990, 28) has suggested that Schumpeter was a non-Walrasian but bound to Walrasian
tools of analysis: “it was Schumpeter’s misfortune that he attempted to marry it [theWal-
rasian equilibrium theory] with his own theory of dynamic destabilizing entrepreneur-
ship”. Others see him as an eclectic whose approach involved “brilliant mixture, if not
always an internally consistent” blend of “Marxism, Walrasian equilibrium analysis, and
German historical scholarship” (Rosenberg, 1986, 209).
All these statements are true—if we do not take them too literally. Schumpeter was in-
spired by Walras even with respect to his evolutionary economics; his early relationship
with Austrian economists of Carl Menger’s school had some influence; his Walrasian
tools did create problems; and he did include inspiration from Marxism and the histor-
ical school. However, Schumpeter created his evolutionary economics through a new
combination of all these, and several other, sources. This evolutionary economics not
only consisted in an evolutionary economic dynamics. It also required an evolutionary
economic statics, i.e. an analysis of the processes and conditions under which economic
evolution comes to a halt. Since these conditions are very strict, the evolutionary statics
primarily serves as an analytical tool. However, Schumpeter never specified his evolu-
tionary statics in a satisfactory way. Although the main problem seems to have been that
this task is difficult, his respect for Walras induced him to write as if this task had largely
been solved by his great master. It was, of course, a very difficult problem which has not
even been solved today.
When Schumpeter in 1911 wrote his preface to Entwicklung I (viii), he stated that he
had two wishes. The first wish was that economists took seriously his “facts and argu-
ments”. The second wish was that “this work as soon as possible shall be surpassed and
forgotten.” He later extended these wishes to the whole of his work on economic and so-
cial evolution. Even in this broader setting, Schumpeter’s first wish seems today to have
been fulfilled. In contrast, his wish that other researchers should surpass and forget his
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evolutionary vision and analysis has been fulfilled to a much more limited extent. This
observation suggests that we are facing a scientific anomaly. While a pattern of cumula-
tive scientific progress achieved by equilibrium economics, evolutionary economics has
only recently begun to overcome its position as a glaring exception to the norm of cumu-
lative scientific progress. Its position as the second fundamental branch of economics is
still just a logical deduction from Schumpeter’s analysis in Wesen. Whether it will ever
in reality achieve a status similar to that of evolutionary biology is still an open question.
Schumpeter’s books
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